On the 2nd of April, 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. As a response, the United Kingdom assembled a fleet of more than 120 warships, including 65 commissioned ships (warships in active service), to travel 8,000 miles and liberate the Falklands, which it did in 74 days. As of December 2025, the entire Royal Navy comprises 63 commissioned ships.
According to the First Sea Lord General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, today’s Royal Navy is not ready for war. This will not come as a big surprise to anyone familiar with what has been commonly dubbed the “managed decline” of the Royal Navy. A fleet that once commanded over 1,400 vessels at the start of the Second World War now has no presence between Gibraltar and Singapore for the first time in centuries.
The Tale of the Dragon
A recent saga provides a stark illustration of how thin the navy is stretching itself – the case of HMS Dragon. In early March, HMS Dragon was deployed to Cyprus to defend British bases from direct drone strikes. However, this decision – to spare a single ship – was an agonisingly slow, weeks-long, highly publicised political affair, with the Prime Minister directly ordering the movement of a single ship. The deployment of a single ship should not, and has never been, a prime minister-level decision. Yet here we are now.
Not a month later, the UK was forced to “borrow” a frigate from Germany to fulfil its NATO obligations in the North Atlantic. Why? Because HMS Dragon was intended to be the flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1, the NATO mission in question. The departure of HMS Dragon had left a gap in capability, which had to be filled by the German Navy, itself under criticism domestically for having the smallest navy in its post-war history and resorting to borrowing crew from the German Air Force to plug its own capability gaps.
But wait - it gets better. 10 days later, HMS Dragon arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, only to go directly into port for a “routine logistics stop” though she “will remain at a very high level of readiness during this period, able to sail at short notice if required” according to the MoD. In other words, she won’t be able to execute the mission she was sent to do, the very high level of readiness notwithstanding. So, a navy that once commanded utmost respect on the high seas now cannot spare one ship away from home, her deployment is a prime minister-level decision, and even when she arrives in theatre, she immediately is down for maintenance. How the mighty have fallen.
So how did we get here?
Over the last 50 years, the United States has risen to become the dominant military power around the world. This has allowed western Europe to reap a “peace dividend” under the presumed protective blanket of NATO. Successive British governments have gutted the British Armed Forces with the assumption that should European security ever find itself in peril, the United States will step in to protect its NATO brothers. As a result, while the United Kingdom has spent roughly the same amount on defence since the 50s in real terms, while defence spending has tumbled from over 7% of GDP to barely above 2%.
Fewer Ships Doing More For Longer
Following the trend of reduced spending, the UK has ordered precious few ships over the last 30 years to replace its aging fleet. The last Type 45 destroyer was commissioned in 2013 with its replacement still in the concept development stage, vaguely slated for service in “the latter 2030s”, possibly even later, as per recent MoD budget cuts.
The newest frigate (Type 23) in the Royal Navy was commissioned 24 years ago in 2002, with the new replacement Type 31 frigates not due to be in service until 2027, and Type 26 frigates in 2028. This means that overworked frigates laid down in the 1980s and 1990s have reportedly become so degraded that they are uneconomical to repair.
As fewer and fewer Royal Navy ships are being asked to spend more and more time on operations, the amount of time and money that must be spent on maintenance has paradoxically increased. This “doom loop” has caused a disproportionate increase in time getting ships sea-ready, as the ships themselves are spending so much time at sea.
More Money, More Problems?
What makes this harder to excuse is that a 2%-of-GDP defence budget should not be this crippling to the Royal Navy. As an example, in 2025, South Korea spent £35.6 billion on defence at 2.37% of GDP while Britain spent £60.2 billion on defence at 2.3% of GDP during the 2024/25 fiscal year. How is it that South Korea is able to maintain more than twice the number of surface vessels on a defence budget almost half that of the UK? Yes, the Royal Navy still has two aircraft carriers (both out of action, undergoing maintenance) and four nuclear ballistic submarines (on record patrol durations), but it seems that the UK is clearly not getting the best value for its money.
Be that as it may, the percentage-of-GDP figure that the British government and NATO prefer to use when comparing national defence expeditures is not the most accurate measure to use between countries. The UK’s 2.3%-of-GDP defence budget also includes things that the casual observer might be surprised to see included, such as pensions for both military and civilian personnel and partial funding for the intelligence services. France and Italy also both include the budgets for the Gendarmerie and the Carabinieri (paramilitary national law enforcement forces) within their respective defence budgets. Canada counts payouts to victims of sexual misbehaviour and “cultural change” initiatives as part of its defence budget. Bottom line, 2% does not always equal 2% in defence spending.
The Usual Suspects
Politics is another major factor. While the British Armed Forces are well known for their professionalism and can-do attitude, it is still at the behest of His Majesty’s Government. As such, it has fallen victim to the fleeting whims and careless indifference of successive governments (5 in the last 10 years if you’re still counting).
Political indecision regarding greenlighting new programmes and the constant changes to requirements of ongoing programmes have ballooned costs and dragged out timelines. This has led to significant capability gaps as aging platforms are retired or tied up in maintenance well before new replacement platforms are deployed.
Furthermore, due to what can only be described as long-term political negligence, the Royal Navy now faces a bizarre situation where it has more than double the number of admirals (134) than it has commissioned ships (63). That’s approximately 2.1 admirals per ship, compared to 0.89 of the United States Navy. Clearly, it is time for some retirements.
With this in mind, it must be pondered whether the size of the defence budget is really the problem. Yes, the current government’s aims of increasing the defence budget to 3% is a simple answer that generates easy soundbites. However, the degeneration of the Royal Navy is far from a simple question of budget. There is a dire need for more government discipline in strategic spending. Requirements must be chosen more carefully and budgets set in stone. Delays, cost overruns, and faults from the factory must be governed more strictly and punitively against major defence contractors. Unnecessary senior posts must be removed. Programmes that have become obsolete on today’s battlefield must be boldly terminated.
In the face of such diminution of a navy once so great, one begs the question: “How did it come to this?” The Royal Navy and the British government must take a deep hard look in the mirror and decide its future. It remains to be seen if the Royal Navy can pride itself as a blue-water navy in 2030, or if the ghosts of Horatio Nelson and Jackie Fisher will continue to weep from the heavens.
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